metascribe hat Identity and Difference von Martin Heidegger besprochen
cryptic but fascinating take on tékhnē
4 Sterne
This book has been a major influence on how I think of and approach metaphysical questions due to its transcendental critique of the principle of identity as used in logic, allowing for the possibility of taking the horizon of description, a phenomena both historically and culturally contingent, as foundational to systems of decideability rather than proceeding them. That is, an understanding of ontology allows us to understand the ways in which logic, in particular the principle of identity, is actually an artifact of a particular kind of entity with a particular relationship to Being. That is, the relevance and emergence of "logic," i.e. rule-based systems of decideability with epistemic relevance, is contingent on a given set of ontological conditions and structures. This poses problems for the attempt to treat logic as a kind of metaphysical arche/root, or as a system that is universally applicable. The implication of this is an …
This book has been a major influence on how I think of and approach metaphysical questions due to its transcendental critique of the principle of identity as used in logic, allowing for the possibility of taking the horizon of description, a phenomena both historically and culturally contingent, as foundational to systems of decideability rather than proceeding them. That is, an understanding of ontology allows us to understand the ways in which logic, in particular the principle of identity, is actually an artifact of a particular kind of entity with a particular relationship to Being. That is, the relevance and emergence of "logic," i.e. rule-based systems of decideability with epistemic relevance, is contingent on a given set of ontological conditions and structures. This poses problems for the attempt to treat logic as a kind of metaphysical arche/root, or as a system that is universally applicable. The implication of this is an implicitly "anti-Pythagorean" metaphysics.
The most interesting aspect of this, however, is how Heidegger's understanding here compares and contrast with Hegelian dialectics. Perhaps the existence of Hegelian dialectics, even as mere methodology, is a case in point even if Heidegger heavily criticizes it (I've still not fully worked out the contours of the critique). However, my reading of this work could be completely wrong, especially as Heidegger later goes on to talk about tékhnē (if I remember correctly), which would seem like a non-sequitor. However, I suspect this is because Heidegger links logic and tékhnē together. Who knows--Heidegger has always been cryptic. One wonders if this piece had an impact on someone like Gilles Deleuze, as, while he rejects Heidegger's insistence on a deconstruction of the history of metaphysics rather than a continuation of the metaphysical tradition, he seems to treat difference as something which precedes the formation or existence of identity. One may also wonder if Heidegger has had any historical influence among those who attempt to naturalize epistemology.